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POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE LIBERTY
STEVEN J. HEYMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
What is liberty? Much of the contemporary philosophical debate
over this question revolves around the issues raised in Isaiah Berlin's Two
Concepts of Liberty.I In this essay, first delivered as his inaugural lecture
at Oxford in 1958, Berlin distinguishes between a negative and a positive
sense of liberty. In broad terms, negative liberty means freedom from-
from interference, coercion, or restraint-while positive liberty means
freedom to, or self-determination-freedom to act or to be as one wills.
Berlin acknowledges that, on the surface, these two concepts may
seem to be "at no great logical distance from each other-no more than
negative and positive ways of saying much the same thing."'2 But he
argues that historically the two notions have developed in very different
directions. Theories of negative liberty recognize that there is a core area
in which individuals must be free from state interference if they are to
live a truly human life. The positive view of freedom as self-determina-
tion, on the other hand, implies a distinction between two selves-a
higher self that determines and a lower self that is subject to determina-
tion. Berlin argues that, in the history of political thought, it is all too
easy for this higher self to become identified with society or the state, or
with a particular thinker's view of an ideally good or rational life. Free-
dom may then come to be defined as obedience to the will of the state or
conformity with a preconceived pattern of conduct. In this way, Berlin
contends, under the positive view freedom tends to be transformed into
its opposite-into tyranny or even totalitarianism.
Two Concepts of Liberty is justly regarded as a classic, which bril-
liantly illuminates the negative and positive notions of liberty. To one
who rereads the essay today, however, perhaps the most striking thing is
the way in which Berlin's analysis of liberty is distorted by the political
circumstances in which the essay was written. As I have noted, Berlin
* Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology;
A.B. 1979, J.D. 1984, Harvard University. This is a revised version of a paper presented at the
Faculty Dedication held at Chicago-Kent College of Law on March 17, 1992.
1. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969).
2. Id. at 131-32.
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was writing in the late 1950s, at the height of the Cold War. He casts the
debate between negative and positive liberty as a crucial battle in "the
open war that is being fought between two systems of ideas,"' 3 and be-
tween the political systems allegedly based on them-Western liberal de-
mocracy and totalitarian regimes of the left or right.
The ways in which this distorts Berlin's account are not difficult to
perceive. According to Berlin, negative freedom is what "the classical
English political philosophers"-such as Hobbes, Locke, Bentham and
Mill-meant when they talked about liberty.4 As a celebrated statement
of this position, Berlin cites John Stuart Mill's assertion that "[t]he only
freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in
our own way."5 Of course, this statement implies that government
should interfere as little as possible with the exercise of individual liberty.
Taking the statement on its own terms, however, Mill characterizes lib-
erty as freedom to-to develop our own natures, to pursue our own good.
In other words, Mill's celebrated statement of negative liberty turns out
to represent precisely the positive conception that Berlin rejects. As we
shall see, much the same can be said of Locke's theory of liberty. In fact,
Berlin's clearest examples of the negative conception are taken from
Hobbes and Bentham6-philosophers not primarily known for their lib-
ertarian views.
As I have suggested, these difficulties in Berlin's analysis may be
attributed largely to the ideological circumstances of the 1950s. With the
passing of the Cold War, it may be easier to understand the relationship
between positive and negative liberty in our political tradition.
In this essay, I wish to briefly explore the concept of liberty in classi-
cal English and American political thought (by which I mean the period
from the time of Locke through the middle of the nineteenth century).
The classical view of liberty, I shall argue, was far richer and more com-
plex than Berlin acknowledges--or than it is often represented as being
by either its critics or its defenders today.
In discussing the classical conception of liberty, I do not mean to
imply that there was a single, monolithic view. The nature of liberty was
one of the central issues of classical thought. It was the subject of endless
debate in pamphlets, treatises, sermons, and political discourse.
Although there was no one definitive view, however, it is possible to
sketch a conception that was accepted in broad outline by many writers
3. Id. at 121.
4. Id. at 123-24.
5. JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 14 (David Spitz ed., 1975); see Berlin, supra note 1, at 127.
6. See Berlin, supra note 1, at 123 n.2.
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during this period. A useful starting point is Blackstone's account of
liberty in his Commentaries on the Laws of England. Blackstone's dis-
cussion is valuable for our purposes not only because it is broadly repre-
sentative of classical thought, 7 but also because of its great influence on
the American legal tradition up until the present century.
II. THE CLASSICAL CONCEPTION OF LIBERTY8
A. Natural Liberty
Like most classical writers, Blackstone begins with natural liberty-
the freedom that would be enjoyed by individuals in a state of nature,
before the establishment of civil government. He defines natural liberty
as "a power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control,
unless by the law of nature."9
At first glance, Blackstone's definition may seem to embody the neg-
ative view that Berlin advocates. On closer analysis, however, we can see
that this definition includes both a positive and a negative element. The
first branch is positive: "a power to act as one thinks fit." Liberty then is
not merely an absence of constraint but a power-the capacity to act in
accord with one's own reason and free choice.
Blackstone's approach is neither novel nor idiosyncratic, but reflects
a long tradition of understanding liberty as a power to act. This view
may be traced back to classical Roman law,' 0 and was shared by many
writers in the scholastic tradition, whose works had an important influ-
ence on the development of modern natural rights theory. " John Locke
developed a philosophical account of liberty in terms of power in his
Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 12 According to Locke, liberty
was the power to act in accordance with one's own will, and was ulti-
mately rooted in the capacity for reasoned judgment. As the radical
7. See JOHN P. REID, THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION 9, 64-65, 117-19 (1988).
8. For a structural overview of this conception, see the Appendix.
9. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *125 (St. George
Tucker ed., 1803 & photo. reprint 1969). For a similar definition, see JOHN LOCKE, Two TREA-
TISES OF GOVERNMENT II § 4 (Peter Laslett ed., student ed. 1988) (3d ed. 1698) (defining the natu-
ral liberty of men as the "perfect Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions,
and Persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking leave, or
depending upon the Will of any other Man").
10. See JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES 1.3.1 (defining liberty as a power (facultas) to do what one
desires, so long as it is not prohibited by the law).
11. See RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES: THEIR ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT
5-31 (1979).
12. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING bk. II, ch. XXI (Peter
H. Nidditch ed., 1975) (4th ed. 1700).
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thinker Richard Price observed, liberty in this sense meant "self-determi-
nation" or "self-direction." 13 Thus, far from being alien to the classical
conception of liberty, as Berlin would have it, self-determination was an
essential element of that view.
Natural liberty also has a negative element: it is the power to act
"without any restraint or control."' 14 It is true, as Blackstone adds, that
this liberty is limited by "the law of nature." But that law, lacking effec-
tive means of enforcement outside civil society, is more a matter of inter-
nal guidance than of external constraint.15 In this respect, natural liberty
comes close to being a pure form of negative freedom.
Most classical writers, however, believed that such unrestrained
freedom was radically defective. As Blackstone put it,
no man, that considers a moment, would wish to retain the absolute
and uncontrolled power of doing whatever he pleases: the conse-
quence of which is, that every other man would also have the same
power; and then there would be no security to individuals in any of the
enjoyments of life. 16
Therefore, to secure their liberty, and to obtain the other benefits of a
common life, individuals enter into society and agree to obey its laws. In
so doing, they give up a part of their natural liberty-the unrestrained
right to act as they think fit-but gain something more valuable: civil
liberty, which is the liberty that belongs to individuals as members of
society. '7
B. Civil Liberty
As Blackstone defines it, civil liberty is "natural liberty so far re-
strained by human laws (and no farther) as is necessary and expedient for
the general advantage of the public."' 8 For purposes of analytical clar-
ity, we should distinguish between the private and public aspects of the
classical idea of civil liberty. In its private aspect, civil liberty refers to
the individual's freedom in relation to other individuals in society. In a
positive sense, it means the power to act as one thinks fit, within the
bounds of civil law; from a negative standpoint, it means freedom from
all restraints not authorized by law. Private civil liberty, in other words,
13. RICHARD PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY, THE PRINCIPLES
OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE JUSTICE AND POLICY OF THE WAR WITH AMERICA (5th ed. 1776), in
POLITICAL WRITINGS 21-22 (D.O. Thomas ed., 1991).
14. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at "125.
15. Id. at *39-41, *125; see also J. LOCKE, supra note 9, § 136.
16. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *125.
17. Id.
18. Id. (citing JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES 1.3.1).
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is the same thing as natural liberty, modified by civil society. It is liberty
under law-in this case, the private law of civil society which governs the
rights and obligations of individuals with respect to one another.
As lawyers, we generally talk less in terms of liberty than in terms of
rights. In classical thought, liberty was a general concept whose content
consisted of specific rights. The content of private civil liberty was what
Blackstone called "the absolute rights of individuals": the rights to per-
sonal security, personal liberty, and private property.' 9 According to
Blackstone, these rights had their origin in nature-in this sense they
were natural rights-but they were fully defined under the law of civil
society. It is important to observe that these rights were not merely neg-
ative but also positive-they were not simply rights against interference
by others, but rights to be secure in one's life, liberty and property under
the law.20
The individual's liberty in relation to the state, on the other hand,
constitutes public civil liberty. On its negative side, it requires that indi-
viduals remain free from state control except where necessary for the
good of the community. This is negative liberty in the sense we most
commonly use the term today-freedom from unjustified interference by
government. Again, this liberty can be expressed in terms of specific
rights-the constitutional rights against governmental interference with
life, liberty and property, with free speech, and so on, set forth in the Bill
of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.
In classical thought, however, public civil liberty had a crucial posi-
tive dimension as well. The function of law and government was to regu-
late individual liberty for the public good-above all, in order to protect
the rights of other members of society. Thus, Blackstone argues, "the
law, which restrains a man from doing mischief to his fellow-citizens,
though it diminishes the natural, increases the civil liberty of man-
kind."' 2' From this positive perspective, it may be said that "civil liberty,
rightly understood, consists in protecting the rights of individuals by the
united force of society." '22
This conception of liberty as protection is positive in two respects.
First, as we have seen, classical thought holds that liberty cannot subsist
in the absence of law. Moreover, natural liberty is unbounded and hence
indefinite. It is through the law of civil society that liberty becomes posi-
19. Id. at *121-45.
20. See Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Four-
teenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 533 (1991).
21. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 9.
22. Id. at *251.
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tive-that is, realized and determinate. 23 Second, as a member of society
an individual has a claim to be protected in his rights by the community.
This is a positive liberty, or at least a positive right-a claim on the com-
munity to provide something to which the individual is entitled.
It is useful to compare the classical conception of liberty with the
position advanced by one of Berlin's most penetrating critics, Gerald
MacCallum. In a well-known article, MacCollum argues that liberty is
always a triadic relation, under which subject X is freefrom constraint Y
to do action Z.24 On this view, liberty is always both negative and
positive.
As far as it goes, MacCollum's formula captures the classical view
well. Thus, in the context of civil liberty, an individual is free from unau-
thorized restraints to act as he thinks fit. On the classical view, however,
a conception of liberty requires a fourth element as well-the law that
governs the relation. Liberty cannot subsist without a law that gives a
right to freedom on one hand and prohibits interference with it on the
other. As Locke expressed it: "Liberty is to be free from restraint and
violence from others which cannot be, where there is no Law"; thus,
"where there is no Law, there is no Freedom. '25 On the classical view,
then, we should say that liberty generally takes the following form: sub-
ject X is free from constraint Y to do action Z under law L. In the case
of natural liberty, this is the law of nature. In the case of private civil
liberty, it is the private law of civil society.
C. Political Liberty
Most classical writers believed that civil liberty could not be fully
secure except in a society that recognized political liberty as well. Polit-
ical liberty was defined as the power of the community to govern itself,26
and that of citizens to participate in self-government. 27 Once again, this
liberty can be characterized in both positive and negative terms. From a
23. The view that freedom is made positive though law is most fully developed in the philoso-
phies of Kant and Hegel. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS § 44 (Mary Gre-
gor trans., 1991) (1st ed. 1798); G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §§ 3,
211-14 (Allen W. Wood ed. & H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991) (1st ed. 1820). But the same view is implicit
in earlier natural rights thought, which represents the movement from the state of nature to civil
society as necessary for the realization of natural rights.
24. Gerald C. MacCollum, Jr., Negative and Positive Freedom, 76 PHIL REV. 312 (1967), re-
printed in LIBERTY 100 (David Miller ed., 1991).
25. LOCKE, supra note 9, § 57.
26. See, e.g., PRICE, supra note 13, at 22.
27. See WILLI P. ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONS-REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY
AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 156-57 (Rita
Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., 1980); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 24-25 (1969).
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positive perspective, the political freedom of the community consists in
its power to make and enforce laws for the public good. From a negative
standpoint, the community is free to the extent that its power is un-
restricted. In both respects, however, the community's power is gov-
erned by the law of the constitution, which confers governmental power
on one hand, and on the other hand limits that power in order to protect
the civil liberty of individuals from undue interference by the state.28
Political liberty may be viewed as an extension of natural liberty,
which, as we have seen, consists of the natural power to do as one thinks
fit. This natural power can be no greater than the strength possessed by
each individual. Political liberty enables individuals to achieve though
collective action what they could not have accomplished through their
own unassisted efforts. A paradigm example is the protection of rights,
which cannot be adequately defended by each individual on his own, but
only, as Blackstone says, by "the united force of society."
Economic regulation may be understood in similar terms. Although
it limits the natural liberty of individuals to pursue their own good, such
regulation may be necessary to promote the good of the community, on
which the private good of individuals may depend. In such a case, as
Blackstone says, although the regulation diminishes natural liberty, it in-
creases the civil liberty of individuals. Moreover, where the regulation is
adopted by the individuals themselves in their capacity as citizens, their
action constitutes an exercise of political liberty, by which they attain a
good through collective action that they could not have achieved on their
own.
To summarize the classical conception: Natural liberty is the power
to act as one wishes without interference by others. Civil liberty is natu-
ral liberty bounded and protected by law. Finally, law is not simply im-
posed on individuals, but is an expression of their collective political
freedom. As Richard Price put it, running through all "the different defi-
nitions of liberty, there is one general idea[:] the idea of self-direction, or
self-government," by both the individual and the community. 29
D. An Illustration
To illustrate the classical conception of freedom, let us consider how
its categories might apply to one of the central problems of modem con-
28. Similarly, the political liberty of the citizen consists positively in the power to participate in
self-government (e.g., through the right to vote), and negatively in the absence of restrictions on this
power, except to the extent authorized by the constitution.
29. PRICE, supra note 13, at 22.
19921
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
stitutional law, the issue of abortion. A woman has the natural liberty to
act as she thinks fit, particularly with respect to her own body. This
includes the freedom to terminate a pregnancy. Like all natural liberty,
this right may be subject to limitation in order to protect the rights of
other persons. We are back, then, to the question of when the fetus be-
comes a person. At common law, this line was drawn at the point of
quickening, roughly midway through pregnancy. Prior to that point, no
crime was committed in obtaining or performing an abortion.30 Begin-
ning in the nineteenth century, however, many states enacted statutes
that prohibited abortion in most circumstances.
The issue confronting the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, of course,
was whether these statutes invaded the liberty protected by the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the terms we have been
using, this issue related to the negative element of public civil liberty-
that is, the individual's freedom in relation to the state (see Appendix,
II.B. 1), as well as to the constitutional limitations on the political free-
dom of the community (III.A). In Roe, the Court held that these stat-
utes, to the extent that they sought to prohibit abortion prior to the point
of viability (about the end of the second trimester), exceeded the legiti-
mate bounds of state power under the Federal Constitution.
If the freedom to terminate a pregnancy is an aspect of natural lib-
erty that the state may not abridge, then it is an aspect of civil liberty-
not only public civil liberty, or freedom in relation to the state (II.B), but
also private civil liberty, or freedom in relation to other individuals
(II.A). Private interference with a woman's right to obtain an abor-
tion-for example, by blockading an abortion clinic-thus would consti-
tute a violation of her private civil rights.
According to the classical view, the state has an obligation to pro-
tect such rights by making and enforcing laws to prevent interference by
others. This obligation derives from the positive side of public civil lib-
erty (II.B.2). As I have argued elsewhere, this obligation was recognized
in the American constitutional tradition prior to the Civil War, and was
intended to be incorporated into the Federal Constitution through the
Fourteenth Amendment. 31 The Supreme Court, however, has refused to
find such positive rights in the Constitution. 32 Thus, the positive side of
civil liberty remains largely a matter of state law.
30. See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *129-30, KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE
POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 14-15 (1984).
31. See Heyman, supra note 20.
32. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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III. CONCLUSION
Having explored the classical conception of freedom, let us return to
Berlin's argument in Two Concepts of Liberty. Does the positive concep-
tion of liberty tend to support tyranny or totalitarianism? This danger
might indeed be posed by a pure theory of positive freedom that empha-
sized the power of the community to the exclusion of other forms of
liberty. But it might equally be posed by a pure theory of negative lib-
erty, as Hobbes's Leviathan suggests. By contrast to both of these ex-
treme views, the classical conception viewed liberty as a comprehensive
system which included elements of positive as well as negative freedom,
exercised by both the individual and the community, and always regu-
lated by law. According to the classical view, the essential point was to
maintain a balance among the different sorts of liberty, so that the free-
dom of the community did not extinguish that of the individual, or vice
versa.33 The classical view, I would argue, not only better captures the
nature of liberty, but also provides a better defense against tyranny than
either the pure positive view that Berlin attacks or the pure negative con-
ception that he defends.
33. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION 76-77 (1967). For an excellent example of this approach, see St. George Tucker's analysis of
the different sorts of liberty in his edition of Blackstone. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *145
(Tucker ed. note).
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APPENDIX:
THE CLASSICAL CONCEPTION OF LIBERTY
I. NATURAL LIBERTY
"a power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or
control, unless by the law of nature" (1 BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES * 125)
A. Positive (power to act)
B. Negative (immunity from restraint)
[C. The law of nature]
II. CIVIL LIBERTY
"natural liberty so far restrained by human laws (and no farther)
as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the
public" (1 BLACKSTONE * 125)
A. Private civil liberty (liberty of individual with respect to
other individuals)
1. Positive (power of acting as one thinks fit, within the
bounds of civil law)
2. Negative (freedom from all restraints not authorized by
civil law)
3. Private law
B. Public civil liberty (liberty of individual with respect to state)
1. Negative (natural liberty not restrained by civil law and
government, except for public good)
2. Positive (protection and regulation of natural liberty by
civil law and government, to extent consistent with public
good)
3. Constitutional law
III. POLITICAL LIBERTY
A. Of the community
1. Positive (power to make and enforce laws for public
good)
2. Negative (immunity from restraints on this power)
3. Constitutional law
B. Of the citizen
1. Positive (power to participate in making and enforce-
ment of laws by community)
2. Negative (immunity from restraints on this power)
3. Constitutional law
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